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Abstract: From November 2013 to the present day the Ukrainian crisis generated the most severe conflict in 
Europe since the 1990s, while current skirmishes in the eastern part of the country and recent new 
developments have the potential to further tighten the crisis. Notwithstanding the internal elements of the 
ongoing crisis, this paper will be focused on the analysis of its external - geopolitical – dimension. By 
acquiring conceptual framework from Zbigniew Brzezinski’s writings on geopolitics, this article will analyze 
the Ukrainian crisis in terms of strategic, economic and ideological interests of the Russian Federation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A triumph and proclaimed ascendancy of liberal democracy and capitalism that 
was dominant in the Western intellectual and academic circles following the end of the 
Cold War was swiftly faced with the reality of non-resolved ethno-national and territorial 
disputes in Europe, which was primarily evident in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
during the 1990s. In the upcoming two decades different countries politically, 
economically, military, technologically and ideologically challenged the unipolar global 
order and the United States hegemony, with various battlefronts of different scale and 
nature emerging over the Europe. More recent crisis and conflict on the territory of 
Ukraine, triggered by the decision of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych to halt 
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process of deepening and determining relations with the European Union (EU) and 
subsequent Euromaidan protests in November 2013, represent the bloodiest conflict on 
the European soil since the Yugoslav wars in the last decade of XX century.  
The course of events in Ukraine developed progressively – Russia annexed 
Crimea (strategically important peninsula on the northern coast of the Black Sea), which 
was an impetus for introducing sanctions by the EU, the US and other countries; conflict 
moved to eastern part of the country where the self-proclaimed Novorossiya was 
established; two accords were brokered by the Normandy contact group, however the 
peace was not achieved; while at the heart of argument of the ferocity of conflict are 
more than 10,000 causalities, including 3,000 civilians, as well as more than 1.7 million 
displaced people (Coman 2017). Moreover, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and 
strained relations with Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployed 
the new four battalions to the Eastern Europe in order to strengthen the so-called 
Eastern flank.  
Going towards the sixth year of the crisis with the sporadic skirmishes in the 
Eastern Ukraine, three new potential threats is on the horizon that can further 
complicate already fragile state of affairs. The first one is the most recent crisis from 
November 2018 when Russian forces shot at and seized three Ukrainian vessels and 
injured six people. This incident directly reflects Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
since the Ukrainian vessels were planning to go through the Kerch Strait that was 
controlled by Ukraine - on the side of Crimea - and Russia - on the side of Taman 
Peninsula - before the beginning of conflict. As a result Ukrainian President Petro 
Poroshenko declared 30 days of martial law in border areas.  
Secondly, the incumbent Ukrainian President in 2017 announced the intention to 
hold a referendum on Ukrainian membership to NATO (DuVall 2018). Moreover, in June 
2017 Verkhovna Rada adopted a bill that recognizes NATO integration as a foreign 
policy priority (Alexe 2018). More recently, Poroshenko informed the public on 10 March 
2018 via his official Facebook profile that he sent a letter to NATO Secretary General, 
referring to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, where he “officially [set out] Ukraine's 
aspirations to become a member of the Alliance”, thus adding that Kyiv is seeking a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) (Radio Free Europe 2018). This Ukrainian pursuit of the 
MAP evokes the context and discussion before and during the Bucharest summit in 
2008, when NATO was considering to offers the MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, which 
had a strong backing from the US and President Bush. Thus, a new question comes to 
the surface – will Ukrainian integration processes again fuel the internal turmoil in 
society and generate additional tensions in the international community. The third 
threat comes from religious domain and given signals that Constantinople Patriarchy will 
recognize the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as independent. Ongoing crisis in Ukraine has 
internal and external dimensions - former has roots in historical trends, issue of ethnic 
groups and minorities, as well as in overarching political and socio-economic problems. 
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On the other hand, particularly important in the analysis of the Ukrainian crisis are 
impacts of external factors that are predominantly geopolitical in nature. Thus, the 
Ukrainian strategic geographic position, energy resources, significance as a transit 
country for energy, along with its importance for relations between Russia and the West, 
are implying that the crisis contains a geopolitical logic that has to be thoroughly 
addressed. Further, I would argue that disclosing the geopolitical paradigm of the 
Ukrainian crisis in the perspective of Russian interests represents a necessary instrument 
in order to comprehend core rationale and motives behind it. Therefore, this article will 
focus and elaborate on the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests, which will be segmented and 
analyzed in terms of strategic, economic and ideological interests. 
 
Brzezinski’s geopolitical lenses in terms of Eurasia and Ukraine 
 
In order to develop and elaborate on the argument that the Ukrainian crisis has 
inner geopolitical element, it is necessary to provide a conceptual working definition of 
geopolitics. The mere term geopolitics coined Swedish legal jurist Radolf Kjellen in 1899 
and it represents a multidisciplinary method of observing foreign policy, including an 
observation of political geography, international relations, international law, etc. 
(Marklund 2014). In developing a conceptual framework for grasping the external 
dimension of the Ukrainian crisis I will briefly, due to the envisaged scope of the paper, 
build upon the writings of Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to the 
US President and a realist scholar particularly interested in geopolitics. Brzezinski’s vision 
and understanding of the geopolitics was predominantly organized in terms of foreign 
policy instrumentalization. His arguments were developed on the basis of Mackinder’s 
Heartland theory, however within the perspective of the US national and geopolitical 
interests. Brzezinski was not alone in leaning severely on Mackinder‘s paradigms (Sabet 
2015). Even Henry Kissinger, a prominent figure of US foreign policy in the Cold War era 
and former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, emphasized the 
importance of Russia in terms of its position astride the Mackinder’s geopolitical 
Heartland (Sempa 2009). Brzezinski revived Mackinder’s Heartland theory in context of 
the Cold War by arguing that Eurasia represents a pivotal area for the future of 
international politics and geopolitical aspirations of global powers (Knutsen 2014). He 
developed an argument that “whoever controls Eurasia dominates the globe”, and 
through the vision of US foreign policy warned “if the Soviet Union captures the 
peripheries of this landmass, it would not only win control of vast human, economic and 
military resources but also gain access to the geostrategic approaches to the Western 
Hemisphere – the Atlantic and the Pacific” (Brzezinski 1998, 111).  
The bedrock of US strategic and ideological imperative to sustain influence in 
Eurasia in Brzezinski’s writings is in accordance with the imperative to preserve leading 
global geopolitical position.  
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He recognized (1998, 30) the Eurasia as “the chief geopolitical prize” for America, 
given that its “global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its 
preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained.” Therefore, Eurasia is placed at 
the centrum of American geopolitical strategic interests, since Brzezinski believed that 
global affairs were always dominated by the relations within this particular region. Thus, 
he emphasized that the US fundamental geopolitical interest is to prevent the emerging 
of any more influential or even dominant power in Eurasia. Brzezinski was particularly 
interested in the geopolitical significance of Ukraine that derives from its vital 
geostrategic point between Europe and Asia (Balmaceda 2004). Thus, he emphasized 
that Ukraine represents a substantial actor for ensuring the ascendancy within the 
Eurasian region. Furthermore, Brzezinski recognized the Ukrainian important role in the 
geopolitical game on the ‘Eurasian chessboard’ since he argued that Russia without 
Ukraine ceases to be ‘Eurasian empire’ and would have become a predominantly Asian 
imperial state (Rifenbary 2014). In addition, Brzezinski (1998, 46) stated that if Russia 
restores control over Ukraine, with its around 45 million people, major resources and 
access to the Black Sea, then “Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to 
become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.” Therefore, without 
Ukraine, Russia's strategic geopolitical objectives and a tendency for the regional 
hegemony, based on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the Eurasia 
platform, are not likely to be achieved (Balmaceda 2004). In terms of geopolitical realm 
Brzezinski, on the grounds of Mackinder’s theory, distinctly indicated the resounding 
importance of Ukraine for the clash of great powers’ interests in Eurasia, which was 
genuinely confirmed with their involvement and the intensity of the crisis. Hence, in 
order to understand the substance of this subject matter, it is important to determine 
and present geopolitical incentives of external actor that had the most prominent 
impact on the Ukrainian crisis.  
 
Russian geopolitical perspective and interests 
 
The Kremlin’s geopolitical motives regarding Ukraine are broad, complex, inter-
connected and historically rooted. With the decision to take over Crimea, the Kremlin 
has genuinely progressed from soft to hard power with the aim to secure its geopolitical 
objectives in the naval bases in Sevastopol and surroundings (Gotz 2015). Hence, I 
would argue that Russia’s first direct geopolitical move related to the Ukrainian crisis 
reflected its principal strategic interest. The annexation of Crimea, along with the 
overarching impact in Abkhazia, enabled Russian effective control over the substantial 
part of the Black Sea, particularly the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov, which was always 
considered as a strategically vital area (Chossudovsky 2014). The broader community 
became aware of the importance of this area due to the recent naval crisis from 
November 2018, which has a severe potential for escalation of conflict. In addition, one 
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has to keep in mind that Russia obtained roughly 36,000 miles of territory around 
Crimea, establishing the maritime borders with Romania and Turkey (Biersack and 
O’Lear 2014).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Crimean geostrategic position 
 
 
It has to be particularly acknowledged that one of the core Russia’s interest 
related to the annexation of Crimea was to protect the most important naval assets – 
the Black Sea Fleet, based outside of Sevastopol and with a smaller facility in 
Novorossiisk, Russia (Tsygankov 2015). Ukraine and Russia formally divided, after years 
of negotiations, the Soviet Black Sea fleet by signing a Treaty in 1997, with which the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet obtained basing rights in Crimea until 2017 (Charap and Darden 
2014). Regulation of the Black Sea Fleet was perceived as a major incentive for the 
bilateral tensions between Russia and Ukraine in that period. Furthermore, in 2010 two 
states signed the Kharkiv Accords in order to extend the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
presence in Crimea until 2042 (Sharples and Judge 2014). The Kharkiv Accords defined 
that Russia will be paying decreased rent to Ukraine for the Black Sea Fleet’s bases in 
return for the discount on natural gas consumption. With that arrangement, Ukraine’s 
political and economic dependency on Russian energy resources was additionally 
strengthened (Sherr 2010).  
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However, it has to be underlined that the Black Sea Fleet’s significance, as a 
specific geopolitical interest of Russia, is not within its prominent military power. Namely, 
the Fleet is composed of 40 active duty combat ships a number of seaworthy vessels, 
which are supplemented by a variety of sea and land units around the Crimean 
peninsula (Gorenburg 2014). Rather, it is valuable because it secures access to the Black 
Sea, along with the historical (since the late XVIII century) and regional importance of its 
presence. Yet, Russia has stated that it will increase its naval military units in Crimea with 
a new ship and submarine construction, since it does not have obligations under the 
treaties that have regulated this issue before, which limited the number of troops and 
military hardware in the peninsula in the past (Socor 2014). 
Other important benefits that Russia acquired from the annexation of Crimea 
and its maritime territory are energy supplies that are beneath the Black Sea (Biersack 
and O’Lear 2014). Namely, some experts are claiming that Russia gained much of 
Ukrainian oil and gas reserves that are located in the Black Sea (Stulberg 2015). Also, it 
has been indicated that in the Black Sea there are considerably large resources of 
hydrocarbon, and the Ukrainian company responsible for the Black Sea's energy 
potentials, Chornomornaftogaz, was nationalized by the Crimean separatists swiftly after 
the annexation (Biersack and O’Lear 2014). Furthermore, after the referendum in Crimea 
and its integration into Russia, Chornomornaftogaz began to function under the 
auspices of the Russian Gazprom (Socor 2014). Because of the seizure of military 
facilities and oil and gas potentials, officials in Kiev estimated that Ukraine will have, in 
near future, a significant financial loss amounting to 300 billion dollars, including their 
assessment of around 2.3 million tons of oil equivalent (Daly 2014). 
In the context of strategic interest, one should not forget Moscow’s interest 
regarding the defense area, i.e. aerospace and defense industry of Ukraine. Even 
though share of Ukrainian exports in Russia’s total military imports are between 2 and 
4%, the Russian defense industry would suffer a great shortage of substantial 
components without Ukrainian products (Larrabee et al. 2015). In the period from 2009 
to 2013 Russia was the third-largest consumer of products of the Ukrainian defense 
industry, and some parts and services Russia is importing only from Ukraine. For 
instance, particular segments of the Russian military is heavily dependent on products 
from Ukraine – helicopter engines (Motor Sich in the southeastern Ukrainian city of 
Zaporizhia); transport planes (Antonov plant in Kiev); more than half of the components 
of Russia’s ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile force come from Ukraine; a 
Ukrainian state-owned aerospace manufacturer Yuzhmash designs, manufactures and 
services rockets and missiles, which is also of pivotal importance for Russia (McLees and 
Rumer 2014). Furthermore, it is estimated that around 30% of Ukraine’s defense-related 
products in Russia could not be replaced by its domestic production (Larrabee et al. 
2015). Hence, for Moscow that would mean additional investments in the defense 
sector, which would further impact already fragile economic situation.  
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On the other hand, bilateral relations of Ukraine and Russia in terms of 
economy are still under the solid influence of their common Soviet history since the two 
countries have developed close ties over the years with a common market of goods 
(Charap and Darden 2014). One can argue that the Kremlin strongly advocated halting 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA), since it would have multiple negative 
effects on the Russian market, due to the fact that many Russian goods are not in 
accordance with the EU safety conditions and technical requirements (Gotz 2015). 
More important segment of Russia’s economic interest in Ukraine is related to 
the energy sector and it is of profound geopolitical importance. Namely, Ukraine is the 
key transit country for transport of natural gas to Europe from Russia and Central Asia, 
while around 80% of Europe’s gas imports from Russia go through Ukrainian pipelines 
(Cohen and Graham 2009). From those arrangements, Gazprom acquires two-thirds of 
its profit from gas that goes through this energy corridor. It has to be understood that 
Ukraine is also heavily double-dependent on Russia’s energy – a consumption of natural 
gas from the Russian producers, as well as earning most of its foreign income from 
providing the services for the unobstructed transit of energy (Braithwaite 2014). In the 
context of Russian energy policy, Gazprom was halting gas supplies several times over 
the last years (winters of 2005-2006, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009), which affected not just 
Ukrainian, but also energy policy of countries of Western Europe. 
Exploitation of energy dependence is widely recognized as one of Russia’s 
foreign policy instruments, thus energy resources are used to accomplish not only 
economic objectives, but security and political ones as well. Energy policy allows Russia 
to exercise power beyond its borders and to influence the policies of other countries 
that are dependent on its supplies. Hence, the Kremlin has the possibility to coerce 
countries that hinder its foreign policy objectives – for instance, in 2002 Russia cut oil 
deliveries to Lithuania and Latvia after two countries prevented Moscow from 
purchasing major energy holdings (Weitz 2014). The energy potential of Russia was also 
an indispensable part of relations with Ukraine, which, for example, could be viewed in a 
deal from 2010 to extend the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory for 25 more 
years, while in return it would obtain the reduction of gas prices by 30%. 
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Figure 2. Ukrainian energy significance 
 
 
A permanent intention of the Kremlin was to have control of the pipelines that 
go through Ukraine. Therefore, Russia put Ukrainian authorities under pressure to 
accept the joint ownership of Naftogaz, Ukrainian state-controlled gas company. 
Konstantin Kosachyev, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian 
Parliament, summarized this issue plainly: “The idea was for Ukraine and Russia to 
become a single transit space between Europe and China, between European and Asian 
markets” (Wegren 2013). Thus, one has to comprehend that Ukraine, as an energy 
transit country, is of paramount geopolitical importance for Russia - its economy and 
businesses, as well as in terms of foreign policy instrumentalization. 
When it comes to the ideological component, one element has been often 
used for purposes of building public approval regarding geopolitical activities 
concerning Ukraine. Namely, the monumental part of Russian tradition and history is 
located in the capital of Ukraine - the cradle of the Russian civilization is the medieval 
state of the Kievan Rus, a federation of Slavic principalities on the soil of today’s Ukraine 
(Gotz 2015).  
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Also, it represents a sacred place for many Russians since the origins of the 
Russian Orthodox Church derive from the medieval Kievan Rus, where Christianity was 
accepted in 988, which became the cradle and foundation of today’s modern nation-
state. Furthermore, after the Ukrainian independence, Russia lost a number of sites with 
a great historical value, including the first Orthodox monastery and graves of legendary 
medieval knights. President Putin underlined the Russian sentiment for Ukraine, 
particularly for Crimea, while addressing the Federal Chamber after the annexation of 
Crimea by saying: “Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is 
the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat 
of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and 
human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus” (Address by 
President of the Russian Federation 2014). 
In addition, Russian ideological geopolitical perspective is on line with the policy 
of neo-Euroasianism, which conceptual foundation is that Russia derives its geopolitical 
strength from the position between Europe and Eastern Asia (similar with mentioned 
Brzezinski’s reasoning) (Morozova 2009). Therewith, the Russia’s fundamental 
ideological geopolitical objective related to Ukraine is twofold – to block it from 
accession to NATO and to place it in the centrum of its Euroasianism policy (Trenin 
2014). 
Referring to the first objective, Russian national interests concerning regional 
objectives are to ensure its security, as well as preponderance and control over the 
countries of the former Soviet bloc. In that particular geopolitical perspective, the main 
focus was always on Ukraine and the direction of its foreign policy. Here ideology is 
being employed as an instrument for ensuring strategic aims and advantages, which is 
certainly not a precedent in the history of international conduct. Moscow emphasized 
plainly on numerous occasions that the NATO enlargement, which could specifically be 
observed as both strategic and ideological interest, represents a security threat for 
Russia, therefore an essential geopolitical interest of Russia is to ensure its security by 
eradicating the perspectives of the NATO enlargement to Ukraine. However, Ukraine is 
not an isolated example in this context, due to the official standpoint that NATO 
expansion to the countries of Eastern Europe is part of a project to isolate Russia and 
constrain its strategic interests. Moreover, the Kremlin is constantly repeating that in the 
post-Cold war period it was promised to Russia that NATO would not extend to the 
countries that are traditionally perceived as a part of Russian sphere of interest 
(Braithwaite 2014). Therefore, the Kremlin’s firm opposition to the NATO enlargement to 
Ukraine is important in two aspects. Primarily because possible Ukrainian accession to 
NATO could not be observed as an individual issue, since for Russia it would mean a 
significant loss of influence in the whole ex-Soviet area and a profound geopolitical 
defeat.  
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Secondly, with that firm opposition the Kremlin is sending a message that 
Russia is still a significant global subject that is able to preserve its regional dominance, 
and, more importantly, to protect its strategic security interests when they are 
challenged. An important instrument of the policy of neo-Euroasianism is the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU), which is established with an aim to gather and integrate post-
Soviet states around Russia, and subsequently to enhance Russian bargaining power 
vis-à-vis Europe and the rest of the world in political and economic terms (Ditrych 2014). 
The EEU, which operates through supranational and intergovernmental institutions, is 
perceived as an element of confronting Brussels in normative and institutional terms 
within the so-called “shared neighborhood” (Popescu 2014). With the functional and 
solid EEU, Russia has shifted its policy from relying on “soft” power, military strength, 
energy conditionality, towards the establishment of an institutional regime for 
promoting its interest in the post-Soviet space. Brussels’s discomfort with the 
progressive development of the EEU could be noted in the statement, dated just two 
days after signing of the Treaty aimed at establishment of the EEU, made by the 
European Union’s (EU) commissioner for enlargement Stefan Füle: “If we are serious 
about transforming the countries in Eastern Europe, we have to use the most important 
tool for transformation: the enlargement” (Fraczek 2014). 
Russian authorities are trying to take advantage of the EU’s policies that are 
placing integration in the context of the Association Agreement, DCFTA, Visa Facilitation 
Agreements, but not membership. Economic integration of the post-Soviet region was 
usually perceived as the Russian traditional power politics play for the neighboring 
states - colored by the crude power, without institutional strength, and largely 
permeated with a discourse that belongs to the past. However, the EEU has a more 
focused institutional structure than any other previous instrumental attempts of 
gathering the ex-Soviet countries. Thus, the EEU operates as a rule-based organization, 
aligned with the modern international postulates, as well as with the rules and principles 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Popescu 2014). 
In order to regain its influence and secure interests in the post-Soviet sphere, 
the Kremlin introduced the policy which should establish an economic integration based 
on a regulated institutional regime (Ditrych 2014). Strengthening and fostering relations 
between the countries of the ex-Soviet regime is not any more emphasized by the 
emotional discourses about common history and religion, but by the pure economic 
pragmatism. Therefore, Russian authorities underline the specific economic benefits 
coming from the closer relation with the EEU, which is additionally supported by the 
solid institutional organism.  
The intent of establishment of the operative EEU was to challenge the EU 
normatively and to create a unique alternative for the Brussels's set-up in the post-
Soviet sphere. This is especially notable in the case of Ukraine, where Russia is openly 
advocating the EEU as an alternative to the EU integration process (Popescu 2014).  
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With that, the EU and the EEU are involved in direct geopolitical competition 
over Ukraine. With the pro-Russian political elite in power in Ukraine, Putin had an open 
geopolitical context to tighten and intensify the relations among countries of the CIS, i.e. 
to introduce and develop the idea of establishing the EEU (Tsygankov 2015). Indirectly, 
Russia's pushing for Ukraine to become a part of the EEU represented the important 
incentive for triggering the Ukrainian conflicts later on. In 2011, Russia officially invited 
Ukraine to become a member of the ECU, which represented an institutional 
arrangement towards establishing the EEU (MacFarlane and Menon 2014). Ukraine was 
of crucial importance for the relevance of the EEU, therefore Russia was constantly 
stressing the economic benefits of joining the organization, particularly in terms of 
increasing trade (Tsygankov 2015). It is particularly important to note that with an official 
invitation to join the ECU, Ukraine also received promises regarding another significant 
discount on gas prices (Kropatcheva 2011). Nevertheless, Yanukovych rejected the offer 
to join the ECU, but also, what is more important for Moscow's national interests, 
refused to sell the controlling shares of Ukraine's national oil and gas company, 
Naftogaz, to the Russian-controlled global energy company Gazprom (Tsygankov 2015). 
However, the Kremlin understood profoundly the geopolitical context and used 
properly the EU’s indecisiveness to act accordingly. Primarily, the Russian authorities 
offered Ukraine another additional discount in energy prices, along with 15 billion dollars 
as a financial aid (McElroy 2013). Yanukovych’s response was in November 2013 at the 
EU summit in Vilnius, where he stated that Ukraine postpones the AA with the EU 
(Traynor and Grytsenko 2013). That particular decision triggered Euromaidan protests 
that lead to further conflicts on the territory of Ukraine. Due to its size and geopolitical 
significance, the accession of Ukraine to the EEU would bolster this relatively new 
institutional setting in economic, geographic and political terms.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this article was to portray complexity of the crisis that has shaken 
not just Ukraine, rather entire Europe and beyond. The core of that ramification could 
be located in the involvement of external powers that sparked already delicate ethno-
national image of Ukraine. Given that states’ foreign strategies and actions are defined 
by its particular interests in specific historical context, in order to understand the essence 
of the Ukrainian crisis it is necessary to elaborate on the concrete motives of external 
actor involved. Therefore, this article attempted to develop the argument that Ukraine is 
geopolitically attractive in strategic, economic and ideological domain, as well as to 
present geopolitical motives of Russia. In addition, the mere importance of Ukraine, due 
its strategic geographic position, energy resources and corridors, implies that 
geopolitics lies at the heart of the most severe crisis since the last decade of the XX 
century. 
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Brzezinski throws light on the geopolitical significance of Ukraine in the context 
of great powers’ tendency to secure dominance in Eurasia. Hence, he assigned Ukraine 
a pivotal figure on the “Eurasian chessboard” due to its vital geostrategic position, major 
resources, access to the Black Sea and importance for Russian strategic interests. 
Therefore, in terms of realist perspective and geopolitical thoughts, Brzezinski’s 
writings still represent a valuable asset in the analysis of current crisis in Ukraine. At the 
end, I would argue that contemporary global challenges and conflicts require a 
comprehensive analytical geopolitical approach, hence the Ukrainian crisis represents a 
profound argument that geopolitical paradigm, discourse and practices still have a 
major role in contemporary global politics.   
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